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This paper investigates outsourcing decision under certainty and uncertainty. When 
the production activity can be fragmented into two or more processes, an integrated firm 
must be competitive in each of the fragmented processes. There are gains from outsourcing 
when factor prices differ between countries. When factor prices are not equalized 
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I. Introduction 
 There is considerable evidence that many industrial production processes are being 
fragmented and some parts are being imported from other countries. Research & 
Development activities may occur in one country, but production may be outsourced to a 
country with lower manufacturing costs. For instance, an electronic dictionary may be 
designed by a Japanese firm and for the Japanese market, but the product may be produced in 
China where the labor cost is low. While business firms frequently rely on outsourcing to 
save costs, the theory of outsourcing is just beginning to receive some attention in the 
literature. Recently, Chao and Yu (1993) considered fragmentation of an industry into two 
stages. In one industry, an intermediate good is produced using primary goods and a final 
good is produced in the second stage. They analyzed the welfare effects of domestic content 
protection which limits outsourcing of the intermediate good.1  Their analysis suggests that 
domestic content requirement has an adverse welfare effect if the non-fragmented sector is 
more capital intensive than the outsourced intermediate goods sector. 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the outsourcing decision of a competitive 
firm and delineate conditions for partial and full outsourcing under conditions of certainty 
and uncertainty. When a production activity is decomposed into two processes, an integrated 
firm must be competitive in each of the fragmented processes. Outsourcing does not occur 
unless a foreign supplier has a cost advantage. When a firm has a cost disadvantage in any 
process, full outsourcing of that process occurs under certainty. However, it is shown that 
when firms are risk-averse, uncertainty in outsourcing cost discourages full outsourcing and 
dampens international specialization of processes. 
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 This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 considers outsourcing decision when the 
production activity is fragmentable into two processes. Section 3 shows that when the 
outsourcing cost is known, full outsourcing or no outsourcing is optimal and that partial 
outsourcing does not occur. Section 4 considers the outsourcing decision when the 
outsourcing cost is uncertain. Partial outsourcing occurs because of the risk associated with 
outsourcing. 
2. Outsourcing versus Integrated Production 
Depending on the nature of the product, the production activity of an industry may be 
decomposed into many processes. For instance, Airbus produces aircraft by combining 
cockpits produced in France, wings in the United Kingdom, tail sections in Spain, and 
fuselage in Germany but still imports U.S. designed engines from General Electric or Pratt 
and Whittney. For simplicity, we consider a competitive industry in which the output is 
produced by combining two processes, 1 and 2. For example, automobile production can be 
fragmented into two stages. The engine block is produced in the first stage and the rest of the 
body in the second stage.  
To survive as an integrated producer, the firm must be competitive in each of the 
fragmentable processes. If not, the firm may be forced to outsource the uncompetitive 
process to a competitive external supplier. International trade in processes may explain the 
origin of intra-industry trade. 
When will a process be outsourced to a domestic or foreign supplier? If there is a 
large capital requirement, the set-up cost is prohibitive, or the learning cost is exorbitant, a 
process may be outsourced to a domestic supplier that has a cost advantage.  However, we 
assume that production technologies are a public good and identical between countries. Thus, 
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we focus on outsourcing to a foreign supplier that has a cost advantage due to international 
disparity in factor prices.2
If production technologies are identical and factor prices also are equalized between 
countries, there are no gains from outsourcing. Gains from outsourcing can exist only if 
factor prices or production technologies are different. In this case, one process may be less 
costly abroad and the other more costly. Thus, we assume that factor prices are different 
between countries. Specifically, assume that  and *w w> *,r r<  where w and r are the home 
wage and rent, respectively, and the asterisk (*) indicates foreign variables.3
Assume that there are two countries and in each country a firm sells a single output 
under price certainty. The unit isoquants of two processes, 1 1y =  and , are shown in 
Figure 1. Process i uses units of labor and 
2 1y =
Lia Kia units of capital, i = 1,2, and the integrated 
process uses  units of labor and 3 1L La a a= + 2L 23 1K K Ka a a= +  units of capital.  
It is important to note that the capital-labor ratio of an integrated process is a 
weighted average of the capital-labor ratios of the two fragmented processes. Which of the 
two processes is likely to be outsourced? In this case, there are three possibilities. First, the 
factor price differential may not be large enough to cause a fragmentation of the production 
activity and the integrated firm survives. Second, the integrated firm collapses and neither 
process is retained by the home firm. Third, the home firm fragments the production 
processes and outsources one process but retains the other. Which of the two processes will 
then be outsourced? Since , the home firm’s labor intensive process costs less abroad 
and is more likely to be outsourced to a foreign supplier. 
*w w>
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 The zero profit condition for the integrated production holds if, and only if, it holds 
for each production process. The relationship between price and unit costs of the two 
processes and the integrated output are shown by: 
 1 1 1 ,L Kp a w a r= +  (1) 
 2 2 2 ,L Kp a w a r= +  (2) 
 3 1 2 1 2( ) (L L K K ) .p a a w a a r= + + +  (3) 
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If transportation costs are zero, factor price disparity implies that outsourcing the 
costly process is profitable. When fragmentation occurs, one process is necessarily more 
capital intensive and the other less capital intensive than the integrated process. Thus, the 
labor intensive process in a higher wage country can be outsourced to a low-wage country. 
Without outsourcing, the labor intensive process will be a burden to the integrated firm 
because it cannot compete with a team of two firms, each specializing in the process which 
intensively uses its cheaper factor in each country.  
 
 
Since the second process uses labor intensively, it may cost less in the low-wage 
country, and hence it may be outsourced. In the absence of transportation costs, if a foreign 
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supplier has a lower unit cost "2 2 2*L K *p a w a r= + for the second process, the associated unit 
value isoquant shifts to  The level of the corresponding foreign isocost curve 
tangent to it at point C'   will be unity, because the second process is competitive at the 
foreign factor prices. However, the cost of the input combinations at point C' or any other 
point on the same isoquant will be greater than unity at domestic factor prices. Thus, the 
integrated firm must shut down the second process. It simply cannot compete with a team of 
fragmented firms, one specializing in the first process in the high-wage country and the other 
in the second process in the low-wage country. Thus, the integrated firm will be forced to 
fragment the production processes and outsource the second process to the foreign country.  
"
2 1/ .y = 2p
On the other hand, if transportation costs are positive, the integrated firm may not 
outsource the second process. For instance, due to transport costs, an external supplier may 
quote price '2 ,p which is higher than the integrated firm’s unit cost 2.p  Then the foreign 
producer cannot compete, and the integrated firm is not jeopardized. Both processes of the 
integrated firm are competitive, and the unit value isoquant of the integrated firm is tangent 
to the common isocost curve AC. 
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 3. The Certainty Model 
We now formally consider a firm’s outsourcing decision under price certainty. The 
results will then be compared with those obtained under price uncertainty. It is shown that the 
outsourcing decision under certainty is a razor-sharp result because when it occurs, the firm 
outsources the process completely. That is, partial outsourcing does not occur. However, 
when the outsourcing cost is uncertain, it is possible for a firm to outsource some portion of a 
process and hence some in-house production is optimal. 
Assume that the firm has a cost advantage in the first process due to its large capital 
investment, but the second process can be outsourced to a foreign supplier. For example, an 
automobile producer may have an assembly plant, but it may outsource the production of the 
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engine block or tires. Let Z be the total number of automobiles produced, and let be the 
first stage cost of producing car bodies. In the second stage, one engine block is assembled 
with one body frame. The engine block may be produced in-house or outsourced. Let X be 
the number of engine blocks produced in-house, and let Y denote the number of engine 
blocks outsourced. Once the engine blocks are produced in-house or delivered from an 
external supplier, they are combined with other components to form an integrated product 
and there is no assembly cost.  
( )C Z
The first stage production cost is given by ( ) ( ).c Z c X Y= +  If produced within, the 
cost of the engine block is 1 ,p X  where 1 1 1L Kp a w a r= +  is the integrated firm’s unit cost of 
the second process. If outsourced, the firm pays b per unit purchased. In the absence of 
uncertainty, the firm’s problem is whether to integrate the two processes and produce the 
whole product in-house, or to outsource the second process. 
Integrated Production 
If the two processes are integrated, the firm’s profit is: 
 3 1 ( ),p X p X c Xπ = − −  (4) 
where is the in-house production cost of the second process. The first order 
condition for integrated production is: 
( ) ( )c Z c X=
 .3 1 ' 0p p c− − =  (5) 
That is, the output of the vertically integrated firm is determined at a point where price equals 
marginal cost, 1 '.p c+  
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Outsourcing 
Next, consider production decisions when the firm outsources the second process. 
The firm’s problem is to choose X and Y to maximize  
 3 1( ) ( ).p X Y p X bY c X Yπ = + − − − +  
There are three possible solutions. First, the firm produces nothing in-house (X = 0) 
and outsources the entire second process. Second, the firm outsources nothing (Y = 0) and 
produces the entire second stage output in-house, which amounts to no fragmentation as 
considered earlier. Third, in the second process the firm may produce some products in-
house and outsource the rest elsewhere (  To conduct some of the second 
process activity in-house, the first order condition is: 
0, 0).X Y> >
 3 1 ' 0,p p c− − =  (6) 
which is the same condition as that for integrated production examined earlier.  
On the other hand, the first order condition for the firm to outsource some of the 
second process activity (  is: 0)Y >
 3 ' 0p b c .− − =  (7) 
It follows that: 
 0,Y =  if 1 ,p b<  
i.e., no outsourcing is optimal if the outsourcing cost is higher than the in-house production 
cost of the second process.  
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On the other hand, 
 0,X = if 1 .p b>  
That is, if the outsourcing cost is less than in-house production cost, the firm has a cost 
disadvantage in the second process. In this case, outsourcing is not only optimal, but also the 
firm chooses full outsourcing of the second process. For instance, an automobile firm may 
completely outsource the production of tires or engines. Similarly, Airbus imports all the 
engines from its competitors in the United States.  
Finally, if 1p b= , then the firm is indifferent between outsourcing and in-house 
production of the second process, and hence there is no need to fragment the production 
activity.4 Thus, the acid test of outsourcing is whether the firm has a cost disadvantage in the 
second stage: The firm outsources only if the in-house unit production cost of the second 
process is higher than its unit outsourcing cost. Moreover, it results in full outsourcing, as in 
Bond (2000). 
4. Fragmentation under Price Uncertainty 
 The certainty case shows that an integrated firm has no need to fragment the 
production process unless there is a clear cost disadvantage in one of the fragmented 
processes. We now consider the outsourcing decision when the outsourcing cost is uncertain. 
Outsourcing contracts are generally signed before the production quality is checked. A 
contract may fix a nominal price a, but the unit cost of outsourced process b aθ= may be 
uncertain, where θ is a random variable with 1.Eθ =  For instance, if a defect is found, the 
relevant part may have to be recalled and repaired, or consumers may return the product, 
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thereby raising the selling cost of the product. Thus, the actual unit cost b of outsourcing is a 
random variable with expected value .Eb a=   
The expected utility is: 
 [ ]3 1( ) (EU p X Y p X bY c X Y+ − − − + ) .  (8) 
The first order conditions for and are: 0X > 0Y >
 3 1'( ') 0.EU p p c− − =  (9) 
  (10) 3 3'( ') ' ( ') ( ', ) 0.EU p b c EU E p b c Cov U b− − ≡ − − + − =
Since there is no uncertainty for in-house production, (9) reduces to 
 3 1 '.p p c= +  (11) 
This means that the firm’s in-house production of the engine block is unaffected by 
outsourcing cost uncertainty. Differentiating U' with respect to b gives 
 ' "( / ) " 0.dU U d db U Y
db
π= = − >  
Thus, for Y > 0. Thus, (10) implies that for Y > 0 ( ', ) 0Cov U b− <
 3 '.p Eb c> +  (12) 
That is, a risk-averse firm outsources less under price uncertainty than if expected unit 
outsourcing cost is known with certainty. 
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Consider the special case where the expected outsource cost Eb is equal to the in-
house cost. Recall that this was an acid test of outsourcing under certainty. If 1 ,p Eb= then 
the second term, , on the left side of the equation in (10) when evaluated at 
reduces to zero, because 
( ', )Cov U b−
0Y = 3 1'[ ( )]U p X p X c X− −  is no longer a random variable. 
Moreover, the first term on the left side of the equation in (10) reduces to: 
 [ ]3 3 1 3'( ') ' ( ) ( ').EU p b c U p X p X c X E p b c− − = − − − −  (13) 
Substituting 1p Eb= into (13) and using (11), we get 
  (14) 3 3 1 3 1'( ') '[ ( )]( ') 0,EU p b c U p X p X c X p p c− − = − − − − =
which implies is an optimal solution. That is, if expected outsourcing cost is equal to 
in-house cost ( ), then no outsourcing is optimal for all risk-averse firms. Thus, a 
necessary condition for outsourcing the second process is that the expected unit cost of 
outsourcing is less than in-house unit cost, 
0Y =
1Eb p=
2.Eb p<  
 
Proposition 1: Assume that a risk-averse competitive firm makes outsourcing and in-house 
production decisions before observing the unit outsourcing cost b.  
(i) If the expected unit outsourcing cost b is equal to in-house unit cost 1p , 
then no outsourcing is optimal, and 
(ii) If then partial outsourcing is optimal, i.e., a risk-averse firm 
partially outsources and retains some of the second process in-house. 
2 ,Eb p<
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 We now compare the result of Proposition 1 with the certainty case. If the in-house 
unit cost and outsourcing price are identical under certainty (a = b), the firm is indifferent 
about outsourcing and in-house production. If outsourcing costs less (b < a), then the firm 
chooses full outsourcing of the second process. However, when the expected unit outsourcing 
cost is less than the known in-house cost, a risk-averse firm does not choose full outsourcing 
and some output of the second process activity will occur in the home country.  
5. Concluding Remarks 
An integrated firm must be competitive in each fragmented process. Under certainty, 
the firm outsources a process only if an external supplier has a cost advantage. Moreover, 
when it occurs the fragmented firm chooses full outsourcing of the costly process. 
Uncertainty in outsourcing cost tends to prevent fragmentation. Specifically, if the 
expected outsourcing cost is equal to the known in-house cost of a process, no outsourcing is 
optimal for all risk-averse firms. Moreover, a risk-averse integrated firm chooses partial 
outsourcing even if it has a cost disadvantage. In this way, outsourcing becomes a 
diversification strategy. 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 Bond (2001) used a specific factors model and delineated the conditions under which partial 
or full outsourcing is optimal. 
2 This assumption follows the tradition of the Hescher-Ohlin model and differs from Bond 
(2001), in which only the domestic firm has the technology for the second stage. 
3 If domestic factor prices w and r are both higher or lower than their foreign counterparts, 
one country exports all goods to the other country. 
4 In this case, partial outsourcing is also a feasible solution in a mathematical sense. 
However, for an integrated firm, there is no need to fragment the processes and outsource the 
first stage. 
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